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Abstract:  
 
In this paper, we decompose the driving forces of global CO2 emissions for the post-crisis era 
2008–2011 from both production-based and consumption-based aspects. The results suggest that 
non-OECD economies have become the major drivers for the rapid global growth of CO2 
emissions after the crisis. More specifically, the increasing consumption and investment of 
non-OECD economies, as well as stagnation of their emission intensity reductions, have largely 
contributed to global growth of CO2 emissions after 2009. On the contrary, OECD economies 
have a less carbon-intensive life style. Coupled with a decrease in investment and stagnation of 
consumption, the OECD economies have successfully reduced both their production-based and 
consumption-based emissions. However, the magnitude of their reduction is much lower than the 
increase led by non-OECD economies. In addition, both OECD and non-OECD economies have 
started to increase their purchases of intermediate and final products from non-OECD economies. 
Such changes of international trade caused an additional 673 Mt of global emissions from 2008 to 
2011. The results of our decomposition provide both worries about and insights into future global 
climate change mitigation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the global efforts toward climate change mitigation, the global CO2 emissions from 
fossil-fuel combustion and cement production have been growing for decades. While previous 
crises, such as the oil crisis in 1973, the US savings and loan crisis in 1979, the collapse of the 
Former Soviet Union in 1990, and the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, seriously slowed down the 
global growth of CO2 emissions for several years, the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on 
emissions has been very short-lived (Peters et al., 2012). The global CO2 emissions from 
fossil-fuel combustion only decreased by 1.90%, from 28.87 Gt (Gigatonnes) in 2008 to 28.32 Gt 
in 2009 and then sharply increased to 29.84 Gt in 2010 -- a 5.36% increase -- reaching the highest 
annual growth rate recorded since 2004. Ever since then, the emissions have continued to grow, 
reaching 32.30 Gt in 2014 (IEA, 2015). Such persistent growth and the potential for even higher 
future growth of CO2 emissions has led to extensive worries about the target for limiting global 
warming to less than 2°C (see also, Peters et al., 2013; Friedlingstein et al., 2014; Raupach et al., 
2014; Rozenberg et al., 2015).  
 It is interesting to explore what drives the persistent growth of global CO2 emissions, 
especially after the financial crisis. In this domain, structural decomposition analysis (SDA) based 
on input-output tables has been widely employed (see, e.g. Su and Ang (2012), Wang et al. (2017) 
for explicit reviews). SDA can break down the changes in CO2 emissions (or any other variable) 
over time into its determinants, such as energy intensity, production recipe, final demand structure, 
affluence, and population growth. Based on a single-region input-output database, for example, 
the literature reveals extensive use of SDA to identify the drivers behind the changes of CO2 
emissions of a range of countries/regions, such as the USA (Feng et al., 2015), China (Guan et al., 
2008; Gui et al., 2014), Norway (Yamakawa and Peters, 2011), the Baltic States (Brizga et al., 
2014), Taiwan (Chang et al., 2008), Spain (Cansino et al., 2016), and Brazil (Perobelli et al., 
2015), etc.   
 In addition, there is a growing literature that explores the drivers behind global CO2 
emissions growth by introducing SDA on global multi-regional input-output tables (GMRIO): e.g. 
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Baiocchi and Minx, 2010; Arto and Dietzenbacher, 2014; Owen et al., 2014; Malik and Lan, 2016; 
Jiang and Guan, 2016; and Hoekstra et al., 2016. The SDA based on GMRIO can not only capture 
the drivers behind CO2 emissions growth as single-regional IO table captures, such as emission 
intensity, production recipe, and final demand, but can also trace the changes in international trade 
patterns of both intermediate and final products (see also Wiedmann, 2009; Arto and 
Dietzenbacher, 2014; Malik and Lan, 2016). The international trade has not only caused a 
separation of production and consumption of products and embodied emissions (Peters et al., 2011) 
but has also led to significant net growth of global CO2 emissions (Arto and Dietzenbacher, 2014; 
Hoekstra et al., 2016; Malik and Lan, 2016).  
 Despite such extensive literature, the growth of CO2 emissions after the financial crisis in 
2008–2009 is barely discussed. The current literature has either analyzed the annual growth of 
growth of CO2 emissions before the crisis (see, e.g. Arto and Dietzenabcher, 2014; Hoekstra et al., 
2016; Jiang and Guan, 2016), or analyzed the growth from 1990 to 2010 into several sub-periods 
(Malik and Lan, 2016; Malik et al., 2016). One pioneering work focusing on growth of CO2 
emissions after the financial crisis might be Peters et al. (2012). They estimated both the 
production-based and consumption-based CO2 emissions after the global financial crisis, and 
found that, from the consumption-based aspect, economic activities, including large government 
investment and growing consumptions in emerging countries, were the major drivers for the rapid 
rebound of global CO2 emissions from 2008 to 2010. From the production-based aspect, the 
researchers found that developed countries became temporarily less dependent on imports, hence 
slowing down the emissions embodied in international trade, and increased their 
production/territorial-based emissions.  
 In this study, we employed SDA based on a global inter-country input-output table that 
compiled by OECD and decomposed the global growth of CO2 emissions, with a special focus on 
the post-crisis era 2008–2011. One of the advantages of the OECD-ICIO table over the other 
available databases1 is that it distinguishes processing exports and normal productions for China 
and Mexico. Based on single-country input-output tables, the literatures have widely 
                                                             
1 Some other popular GMRIO databases include Eora, EXIOBASE, OECD-ICIO, GTAP-MRIO. Please refer to 
Tukker and Dietzenbacher (2013) for an explicit review. 
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acknowledged that the production recipes and emission intensity of processing exports and normal 
productions are highly different in China (see, e.g. Dietzenbacher et al., 2012; Su et al., 2013; 
Jiang et al., 2016; Su and Thomson, 2016). By employing the OECD-ICIO table, our paper thus 
differs from the literatures that use either single-country input-output table or other GMRIO 
databases, in that it focuses on the impact of different trends of processing exports, with normal 
production in China and Mexico, on the global CO2 emissions. In addition, we adopt Hoekstra et 
al.’s (2016) decomposition idea, and isolate the impact of the changing pattern of international 
trade on CO2 emissions by income group in the decomposition process. As found by Peter et al. 
(2012), developed countries turned to support domestic activities, with the result that international 
trade experienced a serious drop during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Besides, there are signs of 
a further geographic shift of trade to less-developed countries in South Asia and Africa after the 
financial crisis, to seek lower labor costs (see also, Lehmann, 2012; Stratfor, 2013; AfDB, OECD 
and UNDP, 2014). It is also interesting to explore the extent to which such a change of 
international trade patterns influenced the global CO2 emissions after the crisis. 
 Our article is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce our methods and data sources; 
in section 3 we present our decompositions’ results, at both aggregate and individual 
region/industry level. Some policy-related implications of our findings are discussed in section 4. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1. Global Multi-Regional Input-Output (GMRIO) framework and data source 
 
The GMRIO has been widely accepted in tracing the CO2 emissions footprint along global 
production chains (see Wiedmann (2009) and Minx et al. (2010) for reviews). Table 1 presents the 
GMRIO framework employed in this paper. The diagonal matrices of intermediate use give the 
intra-regional intermediate deliveries, that is, the elements zij
rr of matrix Zrr give the intermediate 
deliveries from industry i in region r to industry j in region r, with i, j =1,…,m, where m is the 
number of industries, and r =1,…,n, where n is the number of regions. The non-diagonal matrices 
indicate inter-regional intermediate deliveries, that is, the elements zij
rs of matrix Zrs indicate the 
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deliveries of products from industry i (=1,..,m) in region r (=1,..,n) for input use in industry j 
(=1,..,m) in region s (=1,..,n; ≠ r). The matrices of final demand 𝐅rs(r, s=1,...,n) are divided into 
consumption 𝐅cons
rs (r, s=1,...,n) (including consumption by households, governments, and 
non-government organizations), and investment 𝐅inv
rs  (r, =1,...,n) (i.e. fixed capital formation). 𝐗r 
(r =1,...,n) represents the total output in region r (=1,..,n). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
According to Table 1, we have row equilibrium in matrix notation as follows: 
[
𝐙11 ⋯ 𝐙1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐙n1 ⋯ 𝐙nn
] + [
𝐅11 +⋯+ 𝐅1n
⋯
𝐅n1 +⋯+ 𝐅nn
] = [
𝐗1
⋮
𝐗n
]                                  (1) 
The direct input coefficients can then be obtained by normalizing the columns in the IO table; 
that is:
 
𝐀rs = 𝐙rs(𝐗ŝ)−1                                                         (2) 
where r, s=1,...,n, and (𝐗ŝ)−1 denotes the inverse of a diagonal matrix of total outputs in 
region s.  
Define the input coefficients matrix 𝐀 = [
𝐀11 ⋯ 𝐀1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐀n1 ⋯ 𝐀nn
] , where 𝐀rs  is the input 
coefficient from region r to region s. Then, the Leontief inverse can be calculated as 𝐁 = (𝐈 −
𝐀)−1; that is, 𝐁 = [
𝐁11 ⋯ 𝐁1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐁n1 ⋯ 𝐁nn
] = [
𝐈 − 𝐀11 ⋯ −𝐀1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−𝐀n1 ⋯ 𝐈 − 𝐀nn
]
−1
, where I is the identity matrix, 
with diagonal elements as ones and non-diagonal elements as zeros. The Leontief inverse 
describes both the direct and indirect linkages across regions and industries.  
Using 𝐐carbon
r  to denote the matrix of production-based CO2 emissions by industry group in 
region r and 𝐄𝐈r = 𝐐carbon
r (𝐗r̂)−1 to denote the matrix of carbon emissions intensity per unit of 
output by industry group in region r, the CO2 emissions generated along global production chains 
can be traced as follows: 
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 [
𝐐11 ⋯ 𝐐1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐐n1 ⋯ 𝐐nn
] = [
𝐄?̂?1 0 0
0 ⋯ 0
0 0 𝐄?̂?n
] [
𝐁11 ⋯ 𝐁1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐁n1 ⋯ 𝐁nn
] [
𝐅11 ⋯ 𝐅1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐅n1 ⋯ 𝐅nn
]           (4) 
where the elements Q
io
rs of matrix Qrs indicate the production-based emissions of industry i 
(=1,..,m) in region r (=1,..,n) led by the final demand type o (=cons, inv) in region s (=1,..,n). The 
summation of Qrs, ∑ 𝐐rss  and ∑ 𝐐
rs
r  will give the production-based emissions of region r and 
consumption-based emissions of region s, respectively.  
Recent years have seen a proliferation of GMRIO tables that are available to analyze the 
global energy use and emissions issues, such as Eora, WIOD, EXIOBASE, OECD-ICIO, 
GTAP-MRIO (see Tukker and Dietzenbacher (2013) for a review). Despite difference recipes to 
construct the data, the insights from different GMRIO tables are similar. Moran and Wood (2014), 
for example, compared the results of consumption-based carbon accounts based on four GMRIOs: 
Eora, WIOD, EXIOBASE, and the GTAP-based OpenEU databases. They found that carbon 
footprint results for most major economies disagree by <10% between GMRIOs, and the results 
for the temporal change across models appear to agree. As mentioned, our GMRIO database is an 
inter-country input-output database compiled by OECD. It covers 62 regions (34 OECD regions 
and 28 non-OECD regions) and 34 industries, and 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. 
In particular, it distinguishes the production of Mexico into global manufacturing (serving as 
processing production) and non-global manufacturing (serving as domestic production), and that 
of China into domestic demand, processing exports, and normal exports, because their production 
recipes and emission intensities are highly different. Therefore, we would have n=65 and m=34 
for the intermediate deliveries, and 𝐐carbon
r  and 𝐄𝐈r (r =1,...,65) as a 1*34 vector, 𝐀rs and 𝐁rs 
(r,s =1,..,65) as 34*34 matrix, 𝐀 and 𝐁 as 2210*2210 matrix. For the final use, after we 
aggregate the consumptions and investment, 𝐅rs (r =1,..,65; s = 1,...,62) is a 34*1 vector and 𝐅 
is a 2210*62 matrix. Unlike the other GMRIO database, the OECD-ICIO are only released in 
current prices. To convert them into constant prices for our SDA study of the period t0-t1, we 
followed Lan et al.’s (2016) procedure, i.e. the “convert-first then deflate” procedure (see also 
Fremdling et al. 2007). That is, after converting the monetary data for each country into U.S. 
dollars, we used the double-deflation method with sectoral Producer Price Indexes for the US 
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economy and deflated the GMRIO table at year t1 from current price into a constant price of year 
t02. To avoid uncertainty of deflation over a long period, the base year of constant prices is set at 
year t0, depending on the period t0-t1. For example, in the process of decomposition over period 
2008-2009, the GMRIO table of 2009 is deflated into constant prices of 2008 while the GMRIO 
table of 2008 is directly adopted.   
Regarding CO2 emissions, we mainly rely on IEA’s statistics on CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion and reconcile them into the classification of OECD-ICIO table (IEA, 2014).3 With 
respect to the CO2 emissions by production type for China and Mexico, we adopted the method of 
Jiang et al. (2016) to use intermediate energy in the OECD-ICIO table to proportionally 
decompose the CO2 emissions of China (and Mexico) by three (and two) production types for 
each industry. China’s (and Mexico’s) disaggregations by production type are calibrated to ensure 
that a re-aggregation would result in an official release of IEA at the sectoral level. There are two 
primary-energy-related industries exhibited in the OECD-ICIO table: industry 2, mining and 
quarrying (C10T14); and industry 7, coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (C23). The 
intermediate use of these two industries by production type is used to proportionally separate the 
corresponding CO2 emissions in industry i. Let (i) 𝜃𝑙𝑗
𝑠  indicate the intermediate use of energy 
industries in industry group j for the production type l in country s (= China or Mexico); and (ii) 
𝑒𝑗
𝑠 indicate the CO2 emissions in industry group j of country s (= China or Mexico) taken from 
IEA, then we can estimate the CO2 emissions in production type l and industry group j of country 
s (= China or Mexico) as 𝑒𝑙𝑗
𝑠 =
𝜃𝑙𝑗
𝑠
∑ 𝜃𝑙𝑗
𝑠
𝑙
∙ 𝑒𝑗
𝑠 (𝑠 = China or Mexico) . 4  In a similar vein, the 
emissions of the Rest of the World (RoW) by industry group can be estimated as well, by 
disaggregating the total emissions of RoW proportionally according to their intermediate energy 
                                                             
2 Please refer to appendix B for our procedure of estimating OECD-ICIO tables in constant prices. For more detail 
and explanations, please refer to appendix A of Lan et al. (2016). 
3 That means, in this paper we only focus on the CO2 emissions generated in the productions of goods and 
services. The CO2 emissions from land use, forestry, and household activities by combustions of fossil fuels (e.g. 
driving cars or cooking) are excluded. 
4 Note that our estimations on CO2 emissions by production type follow the lines of Dietzenbacher et al. (2012) 
and Jiang et al. (2016), by taking full advantage of intermediate deliveries. One alternative method is proposed by 
Su et al. (2013) and followed by Su & Thomson (2016), that assumes emission intensities for processing exports 
would be the same as the representative processing trade regions (such as Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu 
provinces) in China. Comparing with the 2007 estimates reported in Su and Thomson (2016),our emission 
intensity of processing exports is 0.094 ton CO2/1000 RMB for year 2008 (vs. 0.089 ton CO2/1000 RMB for year 
2007 in Su and Thomson, 2016), while that of non-processing exports is 0.256 ton CO2/1000 RMB for year 2008 
(vs. 0.232 ton CO2/1000 RMB in Su and Thomson, 2016). 
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use by industry group.  
 
2.2. The structural decompositions of global growth of CO2 emissions in production 
processes 
 
In this paper, we follow the line of Xu and Dietzenbacher (2014), Arto and Dietzenbacher 
(2014), and Hoekstra et al. (2016), and decompose the A-matrix into technical coefficients and 
pattern of international source. That is, we define the total technical input coefficients of industry j 
(=1,...,34) in region s (=1,...,65) from industry i (i-input, i = 1,...,34) as 𝑎𝑖𝑗
∗𝑠 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠
𝑟 . In matrix form, 
the technical input coefficients of region s would be 𝐀∗s = [
𝑎11
∗𝑠 ⋯ 𝑎1𝑚
∗𝑠
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎𝑚1
∗𝑠 ⋯ 𝑧𝑚𝑚
∗𝑠
] as a 34*34 matrix. 
Then, after we horizontally stack the 𝐀∗s matrices and further vertically stack the result 65 times, 
we would have 𝐀∗ = [
𝐀∗1 ⋯ 𝐀∗n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐀∗1 ⋯ 𝐀∗n
] as a 2210*2210 matrix. Let 𝐀s =
[
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
0
⋮
0
⋯
⋱
⋯
𝐀∗s
⋮
𝐀∗s
⋮
𝐀∗s
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
⋮
0
⋮
0]
 
 
 
 
, 
𝐀∗ = ∑ 𝐀ss  is the technical intermediate input coefficients irrespective of the sourcing region.  
Let 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑖𝑗
∗𝑠⁄  indicate the share sourced from region r (=1,...,65) in the input 𝑎𝑖𝑗
∗𝑠 in 
region s (=1,...,65); then in the matrix form, we would have 𝐂rs = [
𝑐11
𝑟𝑠 ⋯ 𝑐1𝑚
𝑟𝑠
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑚1
𝑟𝑠 ⋯ 𝑐𝑚𝑚
𝑟𝑠
] as a 34*34 
matrix (where ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑠 = 1𝑟 ), and 𝐂 = [
𝐂11 ⋯ 𝐂1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐂n1 ⋯ 𝐂nn
] as a 2210*2210 matrix, to reflect the 
pattern of international sourcing. Then the A-matrix can be decomposed as  
𝐀 = 𝐂⊗ (∑ 𝐀ss )                                                          (5) 
where ⊗ stands for the Hadamard product.  
Moreover, we can split the C-matrix into sub-matrices for each region s (=1,...,65). Let 𝐂S =
[
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
0
⋮
0
⋯
⋱
⋯
𝐂1s
⋮
𝐂ss
⋮
𝐂65,s
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
⋮
0
⋮
0]
 
 
 
 
, we would have 𝐂 = ∑ 𝐂Ss . As a further step, the 𝐂
s-matrices can be 
subdivided by source country, i.e. according to the origin of the intermediate inputs. We firstly 
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separate the domestic shares of regions s as 𝐂dom
s =
[
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
0
⋮
0
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
𝐂ss
0
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
⋮
0
⋮
0]
 
 
 
 
, then we classify 
other countries according to OECD definition, i.e. OECD (also known as high-income) and 
non-OECD (also known as low-income) countries. That is, 𝐂oecd
s =
[
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
0
⋮
0
⋯
⋱
⋯
𝐂1s
⋮
𝐂35,s
⋮
0
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
⋮
0
⋮
0]
 
 
 
 
 and 
𝐂noecd
s =
[
 
 
 
 
0
⋮
0
⋮
0
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
⋮
𝐂36,s
⋮
𝐂65,s
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
⋮
0
⋮
0]
 
 
 
 
, in which the sub-matrix 𝐂ss is replaced by zeros. These three 
submatrices by type of source country can be summed such that 𝐂dom
s + 𝐂oecd
s + 𝐂noecd
s = 𝐂s. 
Overall, the submatrices sum to C: 
∑ (𝐂dom
s + 𝐂oecd
s + 𝐂noecd
s )s = 𝐂                                             (6) 
The Leontief inverse can be rewritten as: 
𝐁 = [𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s + 𝐂oecd
s + 𝐂noecd
s )s ⊗(∑ 𝐀
s
s )]
−1                             (7) 
In a similar fashion, the final demand can be decomposed into the determinants of total final 
demand and the pattern of sourcing. Let 𝑦𝑖
∗𝑠 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑟𝑠
𝑟  indicate the total final demand in region s 
for output of industry i from all source regions, ℎ𝑖
𝑟𝑠 = 𝑦𝑖
𝑟𝑠 𝑦𝑖
∗𝑠⁄  indicate the share sourced from 
region r (=1,...,65, including the exports-oriented production types of China and Mexico) in the 
final demand of region s (=1,...,62) for output in industry i (=1,...,34), and define the matrices 
𝐇dom
s , 𝐇oecd
s and 𝐇noecd
s . Correspondingly, the final demand can be decomposed as  
𝐅 = ∑ (𝐇dom
s +𝐇oecd
s +𝐇noecd
s )s ⨂𝐘
∗
                                        (8) 
Furthermore, the 𝐘∗ matrix can be written as the product of V and Y. Let  𝐘 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑦∗1
⋮
𝑦∗𝑠
⋮
𝑦∗𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 with 
𝑦∗𝑠 is the region s’ final demand, 𝐕 = [
𝐕11 ⋯ 𝐕1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐕n1 ⋯ 𝐕nn
] with 𝐕s =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑣1
𝑠
⋮
𝑣𝑖
𝑠
⋮
𝑣𝑛
𝑠]
 
 
 
 
 and 𝑣𝑖
𝑠 = 𝑦𝑖
∗𝑠 𝑦∗𝑠⁄ . 
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Then we would have 
𝐘∗ = 𝐕 ∙ 𝐘 = (∑ 𝐕ss )(∑ 𝐘
s
s )                                              (9) 
The CO2 emissions across regions in time t1 then can be traced as: 
[
𝐐t1
11 ⋯ 𝐐t1
1n
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐐t1
n1 ⋯ 𝐐t1
nn
] = [
𝐄?̂?t1
1 0 0
0 ⋯ 0
0 0 𝐄?̂?t1
n
] ∙ [𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗(∑ 𝐀t1
s
s )]
−1
∙
                                              ∑ (𝐇dom
s,t1 +𝐇oecd
s,t1 + 𝐅noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗ (∑ 𝐕t1
s
s )(∑ 𝐘t1
s
s )               (10) 
     = 𝑓(𝐄𝐈, 𝐂dom, 𝐂oecd, 𝐂noecd, 𝐀,𝐇dom, 𝐇oecd, 𝐇noecd, 𝐕, 𝐘)      
where the summations ∑ 𝐐rss  and ∑ 𝐐
rs
r  give the production-based emissions of region r and 
consumption-based emissions of region s, respectively. Given n factors, there would be n! types of 
decompositions. In this paper, we adopt the recommendation of Dietzenbacher and Bart (1998), 
and employ the average of two polar decomposition formulae to decompose the global growth of 
CO2 emission into each determinant. In addition, it is possible to isolate the impact of changes of 
any factor in country s on global/regional CO2 emissions based on the decompositions. Please 
refer to appendix A for the detailed formula.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Decomposition results of global growth of CO2 emissions  
As aforementioned, we mainly focused on the growth of CO2 emissions after the financial 
crisis. That is, we decomposed the growth of CO2 emissions for the sub-period 2008–2009, 2009–
2010, and 2010–2011. For comparison, the decompositions of emissions growth from 2000 to 
2008, before the crisis, are included. Figure 1a presents the impacts of 6 factors that are related to 
the international trade patterns, including the share of intermediates from domestically produced, 
OECD and non-OECD countries, 𝐃𝐂dom, 𝐃𝐂oecd and 𝐃𝐂noecd; and the share of final demand 
from domestically produced, OECD and non-OECD countries, 𝐃𝐇dom, 𝐃𝐇oecd and 𝐃𝐇noecd. 
Their respective totals, i.e. the impact due to change in purchase of intermediate 𝐃𝐂 = 𝐃𝐂dom +
𝐃𝐂oecd +𝐃𝐂noecd and the impact due to change in purchase of final demand 𝐃𝐇 = 𝐃𝐇dom +
𝐃𝐇oecd +𝐃𝐇noecd, are also included. Figure 1b presents the impact of changes in the remaining 4 
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factors, including the emission intensity 𝐃EI, production recipe indicated by technical input 
coefficients matrix 𝐃A, structure of final demand 𝐃V, and volume of total final demand 𝐃Y. The 
net global growth of CO2 emissions is also included. 
 
 INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The global CO2 emissions from production processes dropped by 206 Mt from 2008 to 2009, 
and then skyrocketed by 1711 and 1213 Mt from 2009 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2011, 
respectively. The degree of annual emissions growth from 2009 to 2011 is much higher than is that 
before the crisis, i.e., from 2000 to 2008. Even considering the drop from 2008 to 2009, the net 
annual emissions growth from 2008 to 2011 is still larger than is that before the crisis. 
Further decompositions show that the difference before and after the crisis mainly lies in the 
changes of emission intensity and trade pattern of intermediates. Changes of emission intensity 
dominated the decrease of CO2 emissions from 2000 to 2008, leading to reductions of 1781 and 
2631 Mt of global emissions for the periods 2000-2005 and 2005-2008, respectively, which 
largely offset the increase driven by growth of final demand. Ever since 2009, however, changes 
in emission intensity have led to increases of CO2 emissions by 180 and 319 Mt for the periods 
2009–2010 and 2010–2011, respectively. Together with the growth of final demand, they jointly 
led to the total net emissions growth. This finding is in line with other SDA literatures that cover 
the period before and after crisis, such as Malik and Lan (2016), Jiang and Guan (2016). 
Another factor showing a different effect before and after the crisis is the domestic share of 
intermediates and final products. Before the international crisis, the change of domestic share of 
intermediates led to decreases of CO2 emissions by 524 Mt and 388 Mt for the periods 2000–2005, 
and 2005–2008, respectively. This suggests that either high-intensive countries (often non-OECD 
countries) decreased their domestic share of intermediate usage, or low-intensive countries (often 
OECD countries) increased their domestic share of intermediate usage. On the contrary, during the 
crisis of 2008–2009, the change of domestic share of intermediate (𝐂dom) led to an increase of 
CO2 emissions by 887 Mt. Although this reverted to negative after 2009, the overall effect for the 
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period 2008–2011 was positive, leading to an increase by 283 Mt from 2008 to 2011. The change 
of domestic share of final products (𝐇dom) also shows different signs of effects on the change of 
CO2 emissions. Before the crisis, from 2000 to 2008, the change of 𝐇dom led to 184 and 133 Mt 
decreases of CO2 emissions from 2000 to 2005, and from 2005 to 2008, respectively. After the 
crisis, from 2008 to 2011, the change of 𝐇dom led to an increase of 64 Mt CO2 emissions. This 
suggested that, after the crisis either non-OECD countries turned to purchase intermediates and 
final products domestically, or OECD countries turned to outsource their intermediates and final 
demand (see also Peters et al., 2012).   
The remaining factors contributed to the overall changes of CO2 emissions very similarly, 
with some minor differences in magnitude before and after the crisis. For example, non-OECD 
countries expanded their share of exports in both intermediate and final products (WTO, 2015). 
Consequently, the change of the share of intermediates from non-OECD countries has always led 
to increases of CO2 emissions, of 862 Mt, 711 Mt, and 21 Mt for the sub-periods 2000–2005, 
2005–2008, and 2008–2011, respectively (see also Hoekstra et al., 2016). The intermediate trade 
has long been dominated by production fragmentation and the resultant intermediate exports 
across countries (WTO, 2013). Such decrease in share of intermediates from non-OECD countries 
implies that the international fragmentation that was mainly led by developed OECD countries has 
seriously slowed down after the crisis. On the contrary, the change of share of final demand from 
non-OECD countries has continuously led to increases of CO2 emissions of 420 Mt, 348 Mt, and 
238 Mt, respectively, for the same sub-periods of 2000–2011. Unlike intermediate trade, the 
source of final demand is mainly influenced by consumer preference. Thus, there is barely change 
in the share of final products by country and it shows similar effects both before and after the 
crisis. 
 
3.2 The decomposition results of regional production-based growth of CO2 emissions, 2008–
2011  
 
 In this section, we further decomposed the production-based growth of CO2 emissions by 
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region for the period 2008–2011. The idea is to isolate the effects of each factor on different 
countries/regions. As final demand is the major driving force of increase in emissions growth, we 
separate the final demand and its structure into four categories, consumptions by OECD and 
non-OECD countries, and investment by OECD and non-OECD countries. In this way, the 
regional growth of CO2 emissions has been decomposed into 19 factors. For simplicity, we only 
list the regions for which production-based CO2 emissions’ changes are larger than 10 Mt from 
2008 to 2011. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
  
 The first observation of fig. 2 is that regions with positive growth of CO2 emissions in 
production process from 2008 to 2011 are mostly non-OECD economies, and the regions with 
negative emissions growths are mostly OECD economies (see also Jiang and Guan, 2016). Among 
them, the domestic productions of China dominated the global growth of CO2 emissions, by 
contributing a 1453 Mt of net growth, while it is followed by India, Korea, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia. On the contrary, USA dominated the global CO2 emissions reduction, by contributing a 
271 Mt of net reduction, while it is followed by UK, Spain, Italy, and non-processing exports of 
China.  
 The major driving forces behind the growth of CO2 emissions for most non-OECD 
economies are their own domestic consumption and investment need, indicated as green and 
purple shaded bars in fig. 2a-2b. Among these, investment demand surpassed consumption 
demand as the largest driving force of China’s domestic production-led growth of CO2 emissions 
(China-D). China launched a 4 trillion RMB stimulus package against the economic downtown at 
the end of 2008. Over half of the money was spent on general and rural infrastructure construction. 
The investment demand of China alone caused China’s own CO2 emissions to increase by 1841 
Mt from 2008 to 2011. In contrast, for most other non-OECD economies, consumption demand by 
themselves and other non-OECD economies was still the dominant driving force of their 
emissions’ growth. One exception is the non-global manufacturing production of Mexico 
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(Mexico-NGM), for which the consumptions of OECD economies increased its emissions. 
Although the NGM productions of Mexico do not directly serve as the final demand of OECD 
economies, they provide intermediates indirectly for its production chains. This suggested that the 
demand on intermediates produced by Mexico did not be influenced by the international financial 
crisis, as a result the emissions increased.  
 Except for the final demand, the changes in production recipe (i.e. technical input matrix A) 
also led to considerable growth of CO2 emissions in a few non-OECD economies, such as Russia, 
South Africa, and Turkey, and in most OECD economies (fig. 2a-2c). In general, the intermediate 
input ratio would experience an inverse U-shape of change with the economic development from 
the transition from labor-intensive economy, to industrialized economy, and further to 
service-based economy (Shishido et al., 2000). The positive contributions of technical input 
matrix on growth of CO2 emissions imply that for these economies, the intermediate inputs per 
output have started to decrease with the transition of service-based economy. Conversely, most 
non-OECD economies, such as South Arabia, Indonesia, Brazil, and Thailand, in addition to 
China’s domestic production, are still at the first stage of a U-shape, experiencing an increase of 
intermediate input ratios and the consequent positive contributions from input ratios on growth of 
CO2 emissions. 
With respect to emission intensity, as mentioned earlier, the overall decrease has been slowed 
down after the crisis. The decompositions also verified such a trend, as the negative contributions 
from emission intensity (DCA) are much smaller than are the positive contributions driven by 
changes in consumption and investment. In some countries, such as the US and France, the 
changes in emission intensity even led to a weak increase of CO2 emissions. This is in line with 
Feng et al. (2015), who found that rising energy intensity, together with increasing population and 
consumption volume, has driven an increase in the US’s CO2 emissions between 2009 and 2011.5   
 Conversely, the change of domestic share in intermediate trade led to a 283 Mt increase from 
2008 to 2011. Figs. 2d-2f suggest that such change mainly happened in some non-OECD 
economies, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. Among these, the domestic sales 
                                                             
5 Note that Feng et al. (2015) decomposed the US CO2 emissions from 1997 to 2013 and found that the decrease 
of energy intensity and changes in fuel mix (mainly driven by affluent shale gas) decreased the emissions 
significantly from 2011 to 2013. Our period, however, only covered 2000–2011.  
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production of China (China-D) has significantly shifted its intermediates from imports to domestic 
products. Given the high-energy intensity and high dependency on coal as primary energy inputs 
of China, such change alone has led to a 305 Mt increase in China’s CO2 emissions (see also Su 
and Thomson, 2016). Most OECD and non-OECD economies have been continuously decreasing 
their requirement share on domestic intermediates. However, the magnitude of this change is 
relatively minor and only partly offsets the increase driven by growing final demand worldwide.  
The shares of OECD and non-OECD economies in the global trade market have also changed. 
Figs. 2d-2f suggest that changes in shares of intermediate and consumptions purchased from 
non-OECD economies has considerably increased the CO2 emissions in most economies. This is 
in line with the trend that non-OECD economies have continuously expanded their share in 
international trade, even after the crisis (see also WTO, 2013). Note that the non-processing export 
productions of China (China-NP) show a quite different trend. The production-based CO2 
emissions from China’s non-processing production experienced a decrease, which is mainly 
attributable to the decrease in share of intermediates of non-OECD economies (‘share of 
intermediates from non-OECD economies’, i.e. 𝐃𝐂noecd  as shown in fig. 2f). While most 
non-OECD economies, such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia 
have expanded their shares in the global intermediate trade by showing positive in 𝐃𝐂noecd, 
China seems to have lost its share by showing negative in 𝐃𝐂noecd. As mentioned earlier, with 
increasing labor and land costs China is becoming less attractive to inflow of foreign direct 
investment. There are signs that the global value chain is shifting to less developing areas, such as 
South Asia and Africa (see also, Lehmann, 2012; Stratfor, 2013; AfDB, OECD, and UNDP, 2014). 
Such change has decreased China’s emissions, but it has increased emissions in the corresponding 
regions that undertook the shares. In sum, the changes of share of intermediate and final products 
of non-OECD economies have increased global CO2 emissions by 259 Mt.       
 
3.3 The decomposition results of consumption-based growth of CO2 emissions, by source 
region, 2008–2011  
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 In section 3.2 we decomposed the impact of global changes in 19 factors such as demand, 
trade pattern, and emission intensity on the regional production-based CO2 emissions. The 
literature have revealed considerable carbon leakage from OECD economies to non-OECD 
economies via international trade (see, e.g. Douglas & Nishioka, 2009; Davis and Caldrin, 2011; 
Peters et al., 2011; Malik and Lan, 2016). Therefore, in this section, we decompose the 
consumption-based CO2 emissions by region, that is, analyzing the global CO2 emissions’ change 
due to changes of each factor in one specific region. Thus, the factors have a different meaning to 
that under production-based accounting. For example, the impact due to changes in total 
consumption of China under production-based accounting explains the impact of changes of 
global consumption demand on China’s emissions within its own territory; under 
consumption-based accounting it explains the impact of changes of China’s consumption demand 
on global emissions. In addition, only the final demand of region s would influence its 
consumption-based CO2 emissions. As a result, the final demand and its structure can only be 
separated into two categories, i.e., consumption and investment, rather than four categories under 
production-based accounting. Consequently the regional growth of CO2 emissions under 
consumption-based accounting would be decomposed into 15 factors, rather than 19 factors under 
production-based accounting. For simplification, we only consider the regions for which the total 
emissions changes are larger than 10 Mt for 2008–2011, as was done in section 3.2.     
Figure 3 present our results. The first observation of fig. 3 is that regions that dominated the 
global growth of CO2 emissions/reductions are similar under consumption-based and 
production-based accounting. As in consumption-based accounting, regions with positive growth 
of CO2 emissions from 2008 to 2011 are mostly non-OECD economies (figs. 3a-3b, 3d-3e), and 
the regions with negative emissions growths are mostly OECD economies (figs. 3c and 3f). 
Among these, the increasing demand of China still dominated the global consumption-based 
growth of CO2 emissions, contributing 1310 Mt of net CO2 growth, while the change of demand 
from the US still dominated the CO2 emissions reduction, contributing 282 Mt of net reduction. 
Even when carbon leakage is taken into account, the global CO2 emissions after the crisis in 2008 
are largely attributable to non-OECD economies.  
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However, the decomposition results provide some new insights. Regarding final demand, 
while the changes in consumption in most OECD and non-OECD economies have been the major 
driving force increasing their consumption-based CO2 emissions, the changes in investment have 
caused different effects across economies. In all OECD economies for which consumption-based 
CO2 emissions reductions are larger than 10 Mt, e.g., USA, Spain, UK, Italy, France, Germany, 
and Denmark, investment shrank after the crisis and, consequently, reduced their 
consumption-based CO2 emissions. Conversely, the change in investment has been the major 
driving force in consumption-based growth of CO2 emissions of most non-OECD economies. In 
some countries, such as China and India, investment even surpassed consumption as the leading 
driving force behind their growth of CO2 emissions (see also Jiang and Guan, 2016).     
The structure of demand also plays different roles among OECD and non-OECD economies. 
The changes in structure of consumption in OECD economies have led to considerable reductions 
for their consumption-based CO2 emissions (fig. 3c). The changes have also led to reductions of 
consumption CO2 emissions in some non-OECD economies, such as China and India, but the 
magnitudes are negligible. In most non-OECD economies, such as South Africa, Vietnam, Turkey, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand, the change in structure of consumption has still led to net 
growth of CO2 emissions worldwide. The changes in production recipe (technical inputs matrix A) 
show similar results. These have led to considerable reductions in consumption-based CO2 
emissions for most OECD economies, whereas they have led to growth in most non-OECD 
economies. In general, OECD economies have a less carbon-intensive life style, with higher 
shares of services expenditure, while non-OECD economies are still obsessed by basic living 
needs, with higher shares of goods expenditure. Given the fact that the decreases in emission 
intensity of most non-OECD economies are not significant enough to offset the effect of growing 
demand on emissions growth, it is reasonable to deduce that non-OECD economies have been the 
leading force for global growth of CO2 emissions after the crisis.  
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With respect to trade patterns, compared with production basis, we argue that the effects of 
trade patterns under consumption basis (as shown in figs. 3c-3f) reflect better the changes of trade 
led by specific economies. The change of shares in intermediate trade from OECD (𝐃𝐂oecd) in 
China under a production basis, for example, reflects the effects of changes in the share of all 
OECD economies on China’s intermediates on emissions, while the change under a consumption 
basis reflects the effects of changes in the share of China’s demand on OECD’s intermediates on 
emissions.  
More specifically, fig. 3f suggested that most OECD economies have tended to increase their 
domestic shares and shares from non-OECD economies in both intermediate and final products 
after the crisis. Such changes have been indicated as positive contributions of the domestic share 
in the international trade of both intermediate and final products’ trade and negative contributions 
of non-OECD share in the international trade of both intermediate and final products. This is 
because OECD economies have generally lower emission intensity than non-OECD economies. 
Consequently, the increasing share of domestic products, rather than imports, has decreased the 
consumption-based emissions for most OECD economies, and the increasing share of 
non-OECD’s products has increased these economies’ consumption-based emissions.  
The non-OECD economies show a different trend. Some of them, such as China, Saudi 
Arabia, and South Africa, have significantly increased their domestic shares in intermediate and 
final products. Such changes have been indicated as positive contributions of domestic shares in 
increasing these economies’ consumption-based emissions. Most remaining non-OECD 
economies, such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, and Mexico, have significantly decreased their 
domestic shares but increased their shares of intermediate and final products from other 
non-OECD economies. Such changes have been indicated as negative contributions of domestic 
shares and positive contributions of non-OECD shares in increasing these economies’ 
consumption-based emissions. 
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we employed structural decomposition analysis to explore the forces driving 
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rapid increases in global CO2 emissions from both production-based and consumption-based 
aspects for the post-crisis era, 2008–2011. The results suggest that emerging non-OECD 
economies are the major driving forces of global growth of CO2 emissions. More specifically, the 
increasing consumptions and investment need, as well as stagnation of emission intensity 
reductions, of emerging non-OECD economies have largely contributed to global growth of CO2 
emissions. On the contrary, advanced OECD economies have a lower carbon-intensive life style. 
Coupled with decreases in investment need and stagnation of consumption need, the advanced 
economies have successfully reduced both their production-based and their consumption-based 
emissions.  
In the process, the new trend of international trade has also considerably shaped global 
growth of CO2 emissions. Most OECD economies, and some non-OECD economies (such as 
China and South Africa), have started to increase their domestic shares in intermediates and final 
products after the crisis. In particular, the increasing domestic share of non-OECD economies has 
led to a 413 Mt increase of global production-based CO2 emissions from 2008 to 2011. In addition, 
most non-OECD economies have increased their shares of non-OECD’s productions of 
intermediate and final products, with the result that global production-based CO2 emissions have 
increased by 260 Mt for the same period. The international trade has apparently experienced a 
geographic shift from OECD economies to non-OECD economies such as China with lower labor 
costs (see also Jiang and Chris, 2017). Furthermore, there are signs of a further geographic shift to 
even less-developed countries in South Asia and Africa (see also, Lehmann, 2012; Stratfor, 2013; 
AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2014). In spite of rapid improvement, the emission intensity of 
non-OECD economies is still much higher than that of OECD economies (Jiang and Guan, 2016). 
In this context, such change of geographic shift in international trade may loom the climate change 
mitigation seriously. 
 Although our decompositions are only for the period 2008–2011, we argue that our results 
can be extended for the near future. Very recently, there has been evidence of stagnation of the 
global growth of CO2 emissions, which increased by only 36 Mt from 2014 to 2015 (BP, 2016). 
The OECD economies have reduced their production-based emissions by 146 Mt, while the 
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non-OECD economies increased theirs by 182 Mt. The leading role of non-OECD economies in 
global growth of CO2 emissions has been sustained (BP, 2016). 
More importantly, it is highly probable that the driving force leading to the global growth of 
CO2 emissions will be sustained. On one hand, the factors that have led to growth of CO2 
emissions, such as increased purchase of goods from emerging non-OECD economies, driven 
mainly by lower costs and higher profits, or increased investment and consumption demand in 
non-OECD economies, which are crucial for improving the living standard in these emerging 
countries, are unlikely to undergo any changeover in the near future. Moreover, as recently China 
established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in addition to current World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank (ADB), that are dedicated to infrastructure investment support for 
underdevelopment regions, there might be some additional growth of CO2 emissions caused by the 
construction of operation of these infrastructures. On the other hand, the further changes of factors 
that lead to reductions of CO2 emissions, such as a decrease in emission intensity, become more 
difficult to maintain. Emission intensity is determined by both fuel mix and energy intensity. For 
fuel mix, BP statistics (BP, 2016) shows that the share of fossil fuels (i.e. coal, oil and gas) in 
global primary energy consumptions remained almost unchanged in past decades, fluctuated from 
86.97% in 2001 to 86.02% in 2015. Feng et al. (2015) also found that the shift from coal to natural 
gas has played a very limited role in decreasing the USA’s CO2 emissions in recent years. With 
respect to energy intensity, although the aspirations of technology transfer from advanced OECD 
economies to emerging non-OECD economies have been apparent for years, the gap has 
remained. 
These observations suggest that, instead of focusing on emission reduction commitments, 
global climate change mitigation efforts should focus much more on commitments to both 
technology transfer and the successful development of new, scalable low-carbon energy sources 
and technologies, without which any international agreement to reduce global emissions will not 
be credible. 
 
 
 
21 
 
References: 
[1]. AfDB, OECD and UNDP (2014) Global Value Chains and Africa’s Industrialisation: African 
Economic Outlook 2014, available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/.  
[2]. Arto, I. and E. Dietzenbacher (2014) Drivers of the Growth in Global Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions. Environmental Science & Technology, 48, 5388–5394.  
[3]. Baiocchi, G. and J. C. Minx (2010) Understanding Changes in the UK’s CO2 Emissions: A 
Global Perspective. Environmental Science & Technology, 44, 1177–1184. 
[4]. Brizga, J., Feng, K. and Hubacek, K. (2014) Drivers of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
Baltic States: A structural decomposition analysis, Ecological Economics, 98, 22-28.  
[5]. BP (2016) BP Statistical Review of World Energy, BP, London.     
[6]. Cansino, J. M., Román, R. and Ordóñez, M. (2016) Main drivers of changes in CO2 
emissions in the Spanish economy: A structural decomposition analysis, Energy Policy, 89, 
150–159.  
[7]. Chang, Y. F., Lewis, C. and Lin, S. J. (2008) Comprehensive evaluation of industrial CO2 
emission (1989–2004) in Taiwan by input–output structural decomposition, Energy Policy, 
36(7), 2471-2480.  
[8]. Davis, S. J. and Caldeira, K., 2010. Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), 
107(12): 5687-5692.  
[9]. Dietzenbacher, E. and Los, B. (1998) Structural Decomposition Techniques: Sense and 
Sensitivity, Economic Systems Research, 10(4), 307 – 324.  
[10]. Dietzenbacher, E., Pei, J. S. and Yang, C. H. (2012) Trade, Production Fragmentation, and 
China’s Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
2012, 64: 88-101.  
[11]. Douglas, S., & Nishioka, S. (2009). International differences in emissions intensity and 
emissions content of global trade. Journal of Development Economics, 99(9-02), 415-427. 
[12]. Feng, K., Davis, S. J., Sun, L. and Hubacek, K. (2015) Drivers of the US CO2 emissions 
1997–2013, Nature Communications, 6: 7714, doi: 10.1038/ncomms8714.  
 
22 
 
[13]. Friedlingstein, P., Andrew, R. M., Rogel, J., Peters, G. P., Canadell, J. G., Knutti, R., Luderer, 
G., Raupach, M. R., Schaeffer, M., van Vuuren, D. P. and Le Quéré, C. (2014) Persistent 
growth of CO2 emissions and implications for reaching climate targets, Nature Geoscience, 7 
(10), 709-715. 
[14]. Guan, D., Hubacek, K., Weber, C. L., Peters, G. P. and Reiner, D. M. (2008) The drivers of 
Chinese CO2 emissions from 1980 to 2030, Global Environmental Change, 18(4), 626-634. 
[15]. Gui, S., Mu, H. and Li, N. (2014) Analysis of impact factors on China's CO2 emissions from 
the view of supply chain paths, Energy, 74, 405-416.  
[16]. Hoekstra, R., Michel, B. and Suh, S. (2016) The emission cost of international sourcing: 
using structural decomposition analysis to calculate the contribution of international sourcing 
to CO2-emission growth, Economic Systems Research, 28(2), 151-167.  
[17]. IEA (2015) CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: 2015 Edition, IEA Press, Paris.  
[18]. Jiang, X. and Chris, C. (2017) The impact on global greenhouse gas emissions of geographic 
shifts in Global Supply Chains, Ecological Economics (SSCI), 2017, 139(9), 102-114. 
[19]. Jiang, X. and Guan, D. (2016) Determinants of global CO2 emissions growth, Applied Energy, 
184, 1132-1141.  
[20]. Jiang, X., Chen, Q., Guan, D., Zhu, K. and Yang, C. (2016) Revisiting the Global Net Carbon 
Dioxide Emission Transfers by International Trade - the Impact of Trade Heterogeneity of 
China, Journal of Industrial Ecology, 20(3), 506-514.  
[21]. Lan, J., A. Malik, M. Lenzen, D. McBain and K. Kanemoto (2016) A Structural 
Decomposition Analysis of Global Energy Footprints. Applied Energy, 163, 436–451.  
[22]. Lehmann, J. P. (2012) China and the Global Supply Chain in Historical Perspective, in World 
Economic Forum: The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains: Implications for 
Developing Economies and Trade Policy, p. 10-16, Geneva, Switzerland. available at 
www.weforum.org.  
[23]. Malik, A. and Lan J. (2016) The role of outsourcing in driving global carbon emissions, 
Economic Systems Research, 28(2), 168-182.  
[24]. Malik, A., Lan, J., and Lenzen, M. (2016) Trends in Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
 
23 
 
1990 to 2010, Environmental Science & Technology, 50 (9), 4722–4730.  
[25]. Minx, J., Wiedmann, T., Wood, R., Peters, G. P., Lenzen, M., Owen, A., Scott, K., Barrett, J., 
Hubacek, K., Baiocchi, G., Paul, A., Dawkins, E., Briggs, J., Guan, D., Suh, S., Ackerman, F., 
(2010) Input-Output Analysis and Carbon Foot printing: An Overview of Applications, 
Economic Systems Research, 21(3): 187-216.  
[26]. Moran D. and Wood, R. (2014),-based carbon accounts, Economic Systems Research, 2014, 
26(3): 245-261. 
[27]. Owen, A., K. Steen-Olsen, J. Barrett, T. Wiedmann and M. Lenzen (2014) A Structural 
Decomposition Approach to Comparing MRIO Databases. Economic Systems Research, 26, 
262–283.  
[28]. Perobelli, F. S., Faria, W. R. and de Almeida Vale, V. (2015) The increase in Brazilian 
household income and its impact on CO2 emissions: Evidence for 2003 and 2009 from input–
output tables, Energy Economics, 52, 228–239.  
[29]. Peters, G. P., Andrew, R. M., Boden, T., Canadell, J. G., Ciais, P., Le Quéré, C., Marland, G., 
Raupach, M. R. and Wilson, C. (2013) The challenge to keep global warming below 2 °C, 
Nature Climate Change, 3, 4–6. 
[30]. Peters, G. P., J. C. Minx, C. L. Weber and O. Edenhofer (2011) Growth in Emission Transfers 
Via International Trade from 1990 to 2008. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
108, 8903–8908.  
[31]. Peters, G. P., Marland, G., Le Quéré, C., Boden, T., Canadell, J. G. and Raupach, M. R. (2012) 
Rapid growth in CO2 emissions after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, Nature Climate 
Change, 2(1), 1-4.  
[32]. Raupach, M. R., Davis, S. J., Peters, G. P., Andrew, R. M., Canadell, J. G., Ciais, P., 
Friedlingstein, P., Jotzo, F., van Vuuren, D. P. and Le Quéré C. (2014) Sharing a quota on 
cumulative carbon emissions, Nature Climate Change 4, 873–879.  
[33]. Rozenberg, J., Davis, S. J., Narloch, U. and Hallegatte, S. (2015) Climate constraints on the 
carbon intensity of economic growth, Environmental Research Letters, 10 (9), 1-9.  
 
24 
 
[34]. Shishido, S., Nobukuni, M., Kawamura, K., Akita, T. and Furukawa, S. (2000) An 
International Comparison of Leontief Input-Output Coefficients and its Application to 
Structural Growth Patterns, Economic Systems Research, 12(1), 45-64  
[35]. Stratfor (2013), The PC16: Identifying China's Successors, Stratfor publication, United 
States. 
[36]. Su B. and Ang, B. W. (2012). Structural Decomposition Analysis Applied to Energy and 
Emissions: Some Methodological Developments, Energy Economics, 34(1), 177–88. 
[37]. Su, B., Ang, B. W. and Low, M. (2013). Input-output analysis of CO2 emissions embodied in 
trade and the driving forces: Processing and normal exports. Ecological Economics, 88, 
119-125.  
[38]. Su, B. and Thomson, E. (2016) China’s carbon emissions embodied in (normal and 
processing) exports and their driving forces, 2006-2012. Energy Economics, 59, 414-422.  
[39]. Tukker A. and Dietzenbacher, E. (2013) Global multiregional input-output frameworks: An 
introduction and outlook, Economic Systems Research, 15(1): 1-19.  
[40]. Wang, H., Ang, B. W. and Su, B. (2017) Assessing drivers of economy-wide energy use and 
emissions: IDA versus SDA, Energy Policy, 107: 585-599. 
[41]. Wiedmann, T. (2009) A Review of Recent Multi-Region Input-Output Models Used for 
Consumption-Based Emission and Resource Accounting, Ecological Economics, 69(2): 
211-222.  
[42]. WTO (2013) World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade. Geneva, 
World Trade organisation.  
[43]. WTO (2015) International Trade Statistics 2015. Geneva, World Trade organisation.  
[44]. Yamakawa, A. and G. P. Peters (2011) Structural Decomposition Analysis of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in Norway 1990–2002. Economic Systems Research, 23, 303–318.  
 
 
 
  
 
25 
 
Appendix A. The decomposition formula 
 
A.1 The decomposition formula of global CO2 emissions change  
 
The global CO2 emissions change for the period t0-t1 can be decomposed into impact by 10 
factors. Let 𝐃EI represent the impact of changes in emissions intensity, 𝐃𝐂dom represent the 
impact of changes in domestic shares in intermediate inputs, 𝐃𝐂oecd represent the impact of 
changes in shares of OECD countries in providing intermediate inputs (excl. domestically 
provided), 𝐃𝐂noecd  represent the impact of changes in shares of non-OECD countries in 
providing intermediate inputs  (excl. domestically provided), 𝐃A  represent the impact of 
changes in technical intermediate input coefficients, 𝐃𝐇dom represent the impact of changes in 
domestic share of final products, 𝐃𝐇oecd represent the impact of changes in share of OECD 
countries in providing final products (excl. domestically provided), 𝐃𝐇noecd represent the impact 
of changes in share of non-OECD countries in providing final products (excl. domestically 
provided), 𝐃V represent the impact of structural change of final demand by 34 industries, 𝐃Y 
represent the impact of changes in total volumes of final demand. The effects of each of the 10 
factors on global CO2 emissions change for the period t0-t1 can be calculated as follows: 
 𝐃EI =
1
2
(𝐄𝐈t1 − 𝐄𝐈t0) ∙ [(𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1 + (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1  ∙ 𝐇t0⊗
𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0]                                                                  (A.1) 
 𝐃𝐂dom =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ [
(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ )
−1
−(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ )
−1] ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1   (A.2) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ [
(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )s ⊗𝐀t0
∗ )
−1
−(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )s ⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1
] ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
 𝐃𝐂oecd =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ [
(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ )
−1
−(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ )
−1] ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1   (A.3) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ [
(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )s ⊗𝐀t0
∗ )
−1
−(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )s ⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1
] ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
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 𝐃𝐂noecd =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ [
(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ )
−1
−(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ )
−1] ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1  (A.4) 
   +
1
2
𝐂𝐀t1 ∙ [
(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t0
∗ )
−1
−(𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )s ⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1
] ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
 𝐃A =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ [
(𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1
−(𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1
] ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1                          (A.5) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ [
(𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1
−(𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1
] ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
 𝐃𝐇dom =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ (∑ 𝐇dom
s,t1
s − ∑ 𝐇dom
s,t0
s )⊗ 𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1            (A.6) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ (∑ 𝐇dom
s,t1
s − ∑ 𝐇dom
s,t0
s )⊗ 𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
 𝐃𝐇oecd =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ (∑ 𝐇oecd
s,t1
s − ∑ 𝐇oecd
s,t0
s )⊗ 𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1           (A.7) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ (∑ 𝐇oecd
s,t1
s − ∑ 𝐇oecd
s,t0
s )⊗ 𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
 𝐃𝐇noecd =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ (∑ 𝐇noecd
s,t1
s − ∑ 𝐇noecd
s,t0
s )⊗ 𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1        (A.8) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ (∑ 𝐇noecd
s,t1
s − ∑ 𝐇noecd
s,t0
s )⊗ 𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
 𝐃V =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t0⊗(𝐕t1 − 𝐕t0) ∙ 𝐘t1                     (A.9) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗(𝐕t1 − 𝐕t0) ∙ 𝐘t0 
 𝐃Y =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ (𝐘t1 − 𝐘t0)                      (A.10) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ (𝐘t1 − 𝐘t0) 
Note that the effects of changes in final demand can be further separated into the changes in 
consumptions and fixed capital formation, by separating 𝐇dom, 𝐇oecd, 𝐇noecd, 𝐕 and 𝐘  for 
consumptions or fixed capital formation only.  
 
A.2 The decomposition formula of regional production-based and consumption-based CO2 
emissions change  
 
The above formulate can be extended to the decomposition of regional CO2 emissions change. 
Note that, however, the accounting system matters when we discuss the regional CO2 emissions 
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change. More specifically, the production-based and consumption-based CO2 emissions of region 
s in time t1 can be traced as: 
𝐐s_ p = 𝐄?̂?t1
s ∙ [𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗ (∑ 𝐀t1
s
s )]
−1
∙  ∑ (𝐇dom
s,t1 +𝐇oecd
s,t1 +s
𝐇noecd
s,t1 )⊗ (∑ 𝐕t1
s
s )(∑ 𝐘t1
s
s )                                                  (A.11a) 
𝐐s_ c = 𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ [𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗(∑ 𝐀t1
s
s )]
−1
∙  ∑ (𝐇dom
s,t1 +𝐇oecd
s,t1 +𝐇noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗
(∑ 𝐕t1
s
s )(𝐘t1
s )                                                         (A.11b) 
 
where 𝐄𝐈t1 is the global emission intensity, 𝐄?̂?t1
s  is a diagonal emission intensity filled with the 
emission intensity of region s at year t1 and others with zeros; ∑ 𝐘t1
s
s  is the global final demand, 
𝐘t1
s  is the final demand of region s. Equation 11a gives the production-based emissions of region s, 
i.e., emissions in region s due to global final demand; and equation 11b gives the 
consumption-based emissions of region s, i.e., global emissions due to final demand of region s. It 
can be found that the difference of production-based and consumption-based emissions 
decompositions mainly lies in the way how emission intensity multiply with output.  
In a similar way, assume that only the emission intensity of region s change and other factors 
remain unchanged, its impact on regional production-based and consumption-based CO2 
emissions would be: 
 𝐃EI
s _p =
1
2
(𝐄?̂?t1
s − 𝐄?̂?t0
s ) ∙ [
(𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1
+(𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1  ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0
]             (A.12a) 
 𝐃EI
s _c =
1
2
(𝐄?̂?t1
s − 𝐄?̂?t1
s ) ∙ [
(𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1
s
+(𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1  ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0
s ]             (A.12b) 
where 𝐄?̂?t1
s  and 𝐄?̂?t0
s  are the diagonal emission intensity matrix filled with the emission intensity 
of region s at year t0 and t1 and others with zeros, 𝐘t1
s  and 𝐘t0
s  are final demand of region s at 
year t0 and t1. Equation 12a gives the decomposition for production-based emissions, equation 
12b gives the decomposition for consumption-based emissions.  
The impact of changes of structure of final demand in region s (Vs) then can be quantified as: 
 𝐃V
s _p =                                                              (A.13a) 
 
1
2
𝐄?̂?t0
s ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t0⊗ [(𝐕t1
s + ∑ 𝐕t1
k )k,k≠s − (𝐕t0
s + ∑ 𝐕t1
k )k,k≠s ] ∙ 𝐘t1 +
1
2
𝐄?̂?t1
s ∙
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(𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗ [(𝐕t1
s + ∑ 𝐕t0
k )k,k≠s − (𝐕t0
s + ∑ 𝐕t0
k )k,k≠s ] ∙ 𝐘t0              
𝐃V_c
s =                             (A.13b) 
 
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t0⊗ [(𝐕t1
s + ∑ 𝐕t1
k )k,k≠s − (𝐕t0
s + ∑ 𝐕t1
k )k,k≠s ] ∙ 𝐘t1
s +
1
2
𝐂𝐀t1 ∙
(𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗ [(𝐕t1
s + ∑ 𝐕t0
k )k,k≠s − (𝐕t0
s + ∑ 𝐕t0
k )k,k≠s ] ∙ 𝐘t0
s       
where equation 13a gives the decomposition for production-based emissions, equation 13b gives 
the decomposition for consumption-based emissions. 
And the impact of the changes of total final demand in region s (Ys) can be quantified as: 
 𝐃Y
s _p =
1
2
𝐄?̂?t0
s ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ (𝐘t1
s − 𝐘t0
s )                  (A.14a) 
  +
1
2
𝐄?̂?t1
s ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ (𝐘t1
s − 𝐘t0
s ) 
 𝐃Y
s _c =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗𝐀t0
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ (𝐘t1
s − 𝐘t0
s )                  (A.14b) 
  +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ (𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗𝐀t1
∗ )−1 ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ (𝐘t1
s − 𝐘t0
s ) 
where equation 14a gives the decomposition for production-based emissions, equation 14b gives 
the decomposition for consumption-based emissions. 
The impact of changes in outsourcing shares and technical inputs are slightly different because the 
Leontief inverse is involved. Take an example of the changes in domestic share of intermediate. 
Assume that only the domestic share of intermediate inputs in region s changed, its impact on CO2 
emissions can be quantified as: 
𝐃𝐂dom
s _p =
1
2
𝐄?̂?t0
s ∙
{
[𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ − ∑ (𝐂dom
k,t1 + 𝐂oecd
k,t1 + 𝐂noecd
k,t1 )k,k≠s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ ]
−1
−[𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )k,k≠s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ ]
−1} ∙
𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1                                                        (A.15a) 
+
1
2
𝐄?̂?t1
s
∙
{
 
 
 
 [𝐈 −∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )
s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ −∑ (𝐂dom
k,t0 + 𝐂oecd
k,t0 + 𝐂noecd
k,t0 )
k,k≠s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ ]
−1
−[𝐈 −∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )
s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ −∑ (𝐂dom
k,t0 + 𝐂oecd
k,t0 + 𝐂noecd
k,t0 )
k,k≠s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ ]
−1
}
 
 
 
 
∙ 𝐇t0
⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
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𝐃𝐂dom
s _c =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙
{
[𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ − ∑ (𝐂dom
k,t1 + 𝐂oecd
k,t1 + 𝐂noecd
k,t1 )k,k≠s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ ]
−1
−[𝐈 − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ − ∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t1 + 𝐂noecd
s,t1 )k,k≠s ⊗𝐀t1
∗ ]
−1} ∙
𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1
s                                                         (A.15b) 
+
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1
∙
{
 
 
 
 [𝐈 −∑ (𝐂dom
s,t1 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )
s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ −∑ (𝐂dom
k,t0 + 𝐂oecd
k,t0 + 𝐂noecd
k,t0 )
k,k≠s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ ]
−1
−[𝐈 −∑ (𝐂dom
s,t0 + 𝐂oecd
s,t0 + 𝐂noecd
s,t0 )
s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ −∑ (𝐂dom
k,t0 + 𝐂oecd
k,t0 + 𝐂noecd
k,t0 )
k,k≠s
⊗𝐀t0
∗ ]
−1
}
 
 
 
 
∙ 𝐇t0
⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0
s  
where the intermediate inputs columns of other region k (k≠s) remain unchanged, only the 
intermediate inputs columns of region s experienced changes regarding the domestic share of 
region s in intermediates. The equation 15a gives the decomposition for production-based 
emissions, equation 15b gives the decomposition for consumption-based emissions. In a similar 
way, the impact of changes in other shares 𝐂oecd
s ,  𝐂noecd
s , 𝐇dom
s , 𝐇oecd
s  and 𝐇noecd
s  can be 
calculated.  
At the end, the impact of the changes in technical input coefficients (i.e. production recipe A) can 
be quantified as: 
𝐃A
s _p =
1
2
𝐄?̂?t0
s ∙ {
[𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗ (𝐀t1
s + ∑ 𝐀t1
k )k,k≠s ]
−1
−[𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗(𝐀t0
s + ∑ 𝐀t1
k )k,k≠s ]
−1} ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1          (A.16a) 
   +
1
2
𝐄?̂?t1
s ∙ {
[𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗(𝐀t1
s + ∑ 𝐀t0
k )k,k≠s ]
−1
−[𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗(𝐀t0
s + ∑ 𝐀t0
k )k,k≠s ]
−1} ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t0 
𝐃A
s _c =
1
2
𝐄𝐈t0 ∙ {
[𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗ (𝐀t1
s +∑ 𝐀t1
k )k,k≠s ]
−1
−[𝐈 − 𝐂t0⊗(𝐀t0
s + ∑ 𝐀t1
k )k,k≠s ]
−1} ∙ 𝐇t1⊗𝐕t1 ∙ 𝐘t1
s           (A.16b) 
   +
1
2
𝐄𝐈t1 ∙ {
[𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗(𝐀t1
s + ∑ 𝐀t0
k )k,k≠s ]
−1
−[𝐈 − 𝐂t1⊗(𝐀t0
s + ∑ 𝐀t0
k )k,k≠s ]
−1} ∙ 𝐇t0⊗𝐕t0 ∙ 𝐘t1
s  
where the equation 16a gives the decomposition for production-based emissions, equation 16b 
gives the decomposition for consumption-based emissions. 
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Appendix B. Construction procedures of constant-price IO tables 
 
There are two prevailing procedures for constructing constant-price IO tables: (i) first converting 
national currency values into a common currency (by using convertors), typically U.S. dollars, and 
then applying appropriate U.S. price indexes (deflators), which account for price level variability, 
to express the data in constant prices; or (ii) first deflating national currency values by using 
appropriate price indexes (deflators) for the national currency, which account for temporal 
variability in local price levels, and then converting them to a common currency (by using 
convertors), say, U.S. dollars (see Lan et al., 2016 for a review). As the OECD-ICIO has been 
converted into a unified U.S. dollars based on market exchange rate, we adopted the first approach 
of ‘‘convert-first then deflate” in this study to construct GMRIO tables in constant prices. 
With respect to price deflators, there are three series of deflators: gross output deflators, final 
demand deflators and cell-specific deflators. Dietzenbacher and Temurshoev (2012) used 
Denmark data and found that the results of IO impact analysis are very similar as long as one of 
the three series of deflators is available. For the U.S. economy, only gross output deflators are 
available at sectoral level, from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Therefore in this study, we have 
employed the gross output deflator of U.S. economy to deflate the entire GMRIO table from year 
t1 to year t0. It should be noted, that we also used a double-deflation method to derive value added 
in the process, to achieve the table balance in constant prices.  
Reference:  
Dietzenbacher, E. and Temurshoev, U. (2012) Input–output impact analysis in current or constant 
prices: does it matter? Journal of Economic Structure,1(1): 4-10. 
Lan, J., Malik, A., Lenzen, M., McBain, D. and Kanemoto, K. (2016) A structural decomposition 
analysis of global energy footprints, Applied Energy, 163(3): 436–451. 
 
